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Kentucky Developments in 1954: Personal and Real
Property, Future Interests and Trusts
By W. L. MATTrHEWS, JR.*
During 1954 the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided eleven
cases in the property field and related areas which seem worthy
of summary here. A few of these decisions are significant because
they add something new to well-established legal principles, but
most of them are interesting because they show how traditional
legal principles are being applied by the court. Also, some val-
uable contributions treating property problems were published
in the 1954 Volume of the Kentucky Law Journal, and an im-
portant water rights statute was enacted at the 1954 Session of
the Kentucky General Assembly. This article discusses the sig-
nificant cases under appropriate topical headings, summarizes the
law review contributions briefly and treats the water rights statute
at the end.
I. CASES
Personal Property
Gifts:
Delivery adequate to achieve a valid gift is a practical legal
problem which seems to have endless factual manifestation. In
Hardy v. St. Matthews' Community Center,' donor purchased a
twenty-cent lottery ticket entitling the holder to a chance on a
Buick automobile given away by the St. Matthews' Community
Center at the St. Matthews Potato Festival. She wrote the name
of her infant niece on the ticket, mailed the stub to the spon-
soring organization and told the donee's mother: "I have given
each one of your children a chance on some prizes at the Potato
Festival." Possession of the ticket was not transferred to the donee
or her mother, and when it proved to be the winning one, donor
denied having made the gift. The gift was sustained on the
theory that the act of writing donee's name on the ticket and
* A.B., Western Kentucky; L.L.B., University of Kentucky; LL.M. and S.J.D.,
University of Michigan. Member of Kentucky Bar. Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky, Lexington.1267 S.W. 2d 725 (Ky., 1954).
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returning the stub to the sponsor, coupled with donor's declara-
tion of intent to donee's mother, constituted a delivery of the
subject matter of the gift. The court said that delivery may be
symbolic and cited the Kentucky pass-book cases holding that
a deposit of money in the name of infant donees, coupled with
subsequent declarations of intent, is sufficient to constitute a gift,
despite the retention of the pass-book by the donor.2 The court
also said that acceptance is presumed in the case of an advantageous
gift to an infant.3
Strict application of traditional principles governing symbolic
delivery make it doubtful whether a gift is consumated unless
possession of the symbol itself is transferred. Donee's right to
control the subject matter of the gift is essential to his possession
and this right results from transfer of the symbol. Most pass-book
gifts are best explained not on the theory that a symbolic delivery
can be made without transferring the symbol, but on the ground
that the act of depositing money when accompanied by adequate
manifestation of intention is itself a sufficient act of delivery. 4
So here donor's act of writing donee's name on the ticket and
returning the stub to the sponsor was a sufficient actual delivery,
even though the ticket was not handed to donee. This is the only
sensible view of delivery requirements in the instant case if the
subject matter of the gift was the ticket rather than the auto-
mobile. It could hardly have been the latter, since the drawing
had not been held and neither the donor or the donee had title or
claim to the prize until later.
However outmoded the traditional requirements for a legal
delivery may be, the primary function of delivery is evidentiary
in the sense that a definite physical act helps remove doubt as to
donor's intention. Technical requirements as to the nature of the
physical act should not be applied so strictly as to preclude the
enforcement of the gift where donor's intention is clear, and the
2 Collins v. Collins' Adm'r, 242 Ky. 5, 45 S.W. 2d 811 (1931).
'Citing Newlon v. Newlon, 310 Ky. 737, 220 S.W. 2d 96 (1949). This
particular point is unnecessary to the decision reached in the principal case since
it is generally conceded that any donee, infant or not, is presumed to accept any
advantageous gift unless he rejects it.
'After considering the authorities at length, the court said in the Collins case:
"If the deposit is accompanied by declarations or acts showing an intention of
divesting the donor of all dominion and control over the fund and of vesting it in
the donee, it will be given effect as a completed gift." (Emphasis added) 242
Ky. 5, atp. 13, 45 S.W. 2d 811, atp. 815 (1931).
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decision in the Hardy case is sound on this basis. The opinion
might have stated more directly that a clearly intended gift
should not fail for want of a normal-type actual delivery.
Bailments:
The relation of bailor-bailee results primarily from transfer
of possession, but the contractual nature of the bailment must
not be forgotten in determining bailee's liability for breach of
duty. The decision in Williams v. Buckler,5 is significant because
it confirms the rule that a bailee who deviates from the terms of
the bailment is absolutely liable. It is also interesting because the
bailee was a minor. Farm machinery was bailed to the minor for
use on his farm with the understanding that it would be stored in
a particular warehouse when not in use. The bailee stored the
machinery in a different warehouse where it was destroyed by fire.
The court reasoned that a minor has no tort liability for
breach of bailment terms unless a necessary is involved, since the
tort is an incident of a contract; but it classified farm machinery
as a necessary for a minor farmer supporting a wife and child.
The court held that the bailment terminated at the moment the
bailee deviated from the terms by storing the property in an
unauthorized place. This was a conversion, and the bailee was
absolutely liable for the value of the machinery when it was
destroyed the same as if he had taken the property in the first
place without permission.
In spite of the fictious conceptualism involved, this result
seems reasonable enough so long as actual damage or loss occurs
because of deviation from the terms. But does a conversion
occur even though no loss or damage is suffered, and even though
the deviation does not cause the loss. That is, should principles
of absolute liability extend so far as to create liability from the
deviation alone. If so, a rather harsh responsibility is placed on
the bailee which might conceivably deter him from safeguarding
the property in a better way than is provided in the bailment
terms. If deviation without loss or without causing the loss is a
conversion, the proper basis for recovery by the bailor would seem
to be that conversion amounts to a forced sale, and the bailee
must pay the value of the property at the time the bailment is
-264 S.W. 2d 279 (Ky. 1954).
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breached. Among other things, this rationalization over-empha-
sizes the contractual aspect of a bailment. Equally adequate pro-
tection for the bailor would result if bailee's liability is grounded
primarily in tort and based only on negligence. Under this ap-
proach a deviating bailee would be required to exercise the reason-
able care under the circumstances expected of any bailee. Failure
to comply with the terms of the bailment would certainly be an
important circumstance for the jury to consider. The decision
in the Williams case was properly confined to liability where loss
occurs and is not an invitation to take the problem of liability
without loss resulting from deviation before the court. The prin-
ciple of absolute liability for deviation alone should be examined
carefully before it is used to protect the interest of the bailor.
Real Property
Adverse possession:
Title by adverse possession cannot be acquired if the pos-
session is permissive, a point sometimes difficult to prove after
long occupancy; and the difference between an adverse claim
and permissive possession is not always clear, even when the
former can be proved. This distinction was the crux of the con-
troversy in White v. Smith.6 A retired army man who returned to
Knott County in 1932, discovered his two elderly cousins were
nearly destitute. In order to help them, he purchased a four acre
tract of land, repaired an old house on it and placed the cousins
in possession. These elderly people lived on the property until
1950 and made improvements on it from time to time. In 1943,
their benefactor died intestate, and during the next seven years,
two of his heirs purchased the interest of all his remaining heirs.
Then they attempted to negotiate a sale of the property. The
possessors sued to quiet title, claiming ownership through parol
gift in 1932. The heirs contended the claimants' possession was
merely permissive, but the court quieted title in the elderly people
on the theory that an unconditional parol gift accompanied by
actual possession for more than fiftten years, with claim of owner-
ship, gives title. The gift was evidenced by the testimony of one
of the claimants as well as testimony by an attorney that the
6 265 S.W. 2d 937 (Ky. 1954).
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donor had told him many times about giving the property to the
cousins. This seems more than enough to rebut the assertion of
permissive possession by the heirs. If so, claimants' acts of pos-
session would seem to establish sufficient color or adverse claim
of title without reliance on the parol gift.
Litigation arising out of boundary line disputes frequently
presents a close question as to whether principles of adverse pos-
session should govern or whether the parties have fixed the loca-
tion of the disputed line by agreement. The adverse possession
theory was used in Ballard v. Moss, 7 a case illustrating the strict-
ness with which a court may view the acts necessary to constitute
possession. Appellants acquired their lot in 1930, built a residence
and garage on it, and shortly thereafter, planted a row of trees
and shrubbery along what they then considered their east boun-
dary line. They treated this tree and shrubbery line as their east
boundary without interference or complaint until appellees ac-
quired the adjoining lot and constructed their residence in 1942.
The extent to which the trees were thereafter recognized as the
boundary was in sharp dispute. In 1949, appellees had the line
surveyed and discovered that the trees and shrubbery, as well as
the eaves of appellants' garage, extended across the surveyed line
about one foot. Appellees cut the trees and shrubbery, and ap-
pellants sought redress.
Although insufficient time to establish adverse possession had
expired when appellees acquired the adjoining lot," appellants'
occupancy of their lot had existed for more than fifteen years by
the time the survey was made and action filed. Appellants con-
tended their possession extended to the tree line during this entire
period, but appellees offered testimony that from 1942 on they
had trimmed and cared for the trees and shrubbery and had
mowed the grass on the appellants' side of the trees. The trial
court commissioner found that appellants had acquired title to
the land under the eaves of their garage by adverse possession,
but had not possessed the remaining land to the tree line with
sufficient continuity to acquire title to it. The Court of Appeals
accorded the finding of the commissioner the weight to which it is
traditionally entitled, and sustained the judgment.
7268 S.W. 2d 35 (Ky. 1954).
' KRS 413.010 to 413.030.
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The "eaves" part of the decision clearly is in error. The right
to have eaves protrude based on passing of time is not classified as
a possessory right, and gives no title to the land underneath the
eaves on the theory of adverse possession. Rather, a prescriptive
easement for this purpose arises. This distinction is worthy of
preservation because it frequently permits the conflicting interests
of adjoining property owners to be reconciled with a minimum
of interference in title.
In disposing of appellants' adverse claim to the tree line, the
court merely said:
... the possession of the claimant must not only be actual
but so continuous as to furnish a cause of action in eject-
ment or for trespass every day during the statutory period,
(and) under appellees' version of the facts, the appellants'
possession to the row of trees was not sufficient to meet this
test.9
If taken literally, this statement would seem to mean that ap-
pellants should have trimmed the shrubbery, or walked to the
trees, or mowed the grass every day during the full statutory
period. Even if appellees' testimony that they performed such pos-
sessory acts at various times after 1942 is given full weight, the fact
that appellants' occupancy was no different after that time than
before should be worth something. At least there was no affirma-
tive evidence to show that appellants' acts of possession to the con-
tested boundary was any less continuous during the last three
years of the statutory period than during the first twelve years.
Perhaps the court meant that appellants could not possess the
disputed strip after 1942 in the same way they had before because
it was then under the physical control of appellees. In any event
the decision is hard to rationalize except on the basis that an
exceedingly strict test for exclusivie acts of possession is necessary
to protect property owners against the adverse claim of sporatic
occupiers. Such a test hardly seems to fit the ordinary boundary
dispute between neighbors who have lived on adjoining property
for some time.
The Kentucky court has long recognized that an adverse pos-
sessor who actually occupies only a part of the tract may claim to
-268 S.W. 2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1954).
IoPERTrY, FuTuiw INTEEsTs AND TRUSTS
the extent of the description in his deed provided the boundaries
called for are clearly ascertainable. This principle is based on the
premise that the deed gives a color of title to all of the property
included in its description, and that actual possession may extend
beyond actual occupancy. In D. B. Frampton & Co. v. Sauls-
berry,10 appellant land company owned 900 acres encircling the
50 acres in controversy. Appellee had an unbroken chain of title
to the 50 acres back to the original land patent. Although appel-
lant and those persons from whom he claimed title had sporatically
occupied the small tract and cut timber from it, he could not show
that it ever was part of the land described in the instruments
forming his chain of title. The court correctly held that the rule
permitting claim to the extent of the description did not apply
where the described boundary overlapped a senior grant. In such
case, adverse possession cannot rest on claim alone, but must be
evidenced by such physical acts as will give the true owner con-
stant notice of the claimant's possession.
Deeds:
In Riley v. Riley," a deed from a father to his children con-
tained this provision:
It is understood and agreed that the first party hereto
reserves to himself the full use and control of the above
land for and during his natural life and this deed is only to
become effective at his death .... 12
Although recorded on the day of its execution and delivery, the
deed was attacked as testamentary. As might be expected, the
court construed the whole instrument as merely reserving a life
estate in the grantor. Any language in a deed providing for it to
be effective at grantor's death is unnecessary and ill-advised since
this creates doubt that grantor intended for it to become operative
inter vivos. If grantor wishes to postpone possession and enjoy-
ment in the grantee without incurring the formalities in execution
required for a will and without jeopardizing the validity of the
instrument as a deed, all he needs to do is dearly identify the
interest conveyed as a future interest. As experienced convey-
ancers know, unnecessary references to the effective time of the
" 268 S.W. 2d 25 (Ky. 1954).
u 266 S.W. 2d 109 (Ky. 1954).
" Id., at 110. (Emphasis added)
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instrument merely enhance the possibility of ill-founded litigation
such as occurred in the Riley case.
Restrictive Covenants:
In spite of increased reliance on zoning, deed restrictions are
still essential for full protection against neighboring use that is
undesirable, especially in a time when the development and
expansion of commercial areas are accelerated. Most covenant
cases present a construction problem involving the scope or ap-
plicability of the restriction, but Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r,13 is a
significant exception because the decision covers two funda-
mental questions concerning enforcability: (1) whether a party
to the covenant can enforce it if it is not imposed as part of
a general building plan or scheme for the improvement of
several contiguous lots, and (2) whether the grantor-covenantee
himself can lose his right to enforce it through abandonment,
waiver or change in the character of the neighborhood.
The Bagby covenant restricted the property to residential pur-
poses and was imposed when the grantee repurchased land con-
veyed to the grantor earlier by grantee's husband. The restricted
lot joined other unrestricted lots, one of which grantor used as a
residence. Grantor subsequently conveyed all of the lots except
his own, but none of these deeds contained any restrictions. After
this litigation was started, grantor conveyed his own residence for
admittedly commercial use. A declaratory judgment action was
brought to determine the enforceability of the covenant and the
trial court invalidated it. Grantor appealed on the ground that
failure to join one of the subsequent grantees was a fatal defect
of parties. He contended that this grantee could enforce the
covenant if it was valid, and that no action attacking its validity
could be maintained unless he was made a party. The appellate
court let this procedural issue turn on whether persons not a
party to the covenant could enforce it and decided the restriction
was unenforceable by the subsequent grantee or by the grantor-
covenantee.
The Court of Appeals said that the covenant would run with
the land only if this was the intention of the covenantee and that
such intention may be implied where the restriction is imposed
- 265 S.W. 2d 75 (Ky. 1954).
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as part of a general building plan or scheme for the improvement
of several contiguous lots. They concluded there was no evidence
to support such implication here. The court also said that the
grantor-covenantee's right to enforce the covenant had been lost
by abandonment and waiver as well as by change in the character
of the neighborhood. The opinion admits there are no Kentucky
cases directly in point with this principle, but declares the rule
to be the well-settled view in most jurisdictions.14
Due to its unusual procedural twist, the Bagby case probably
should be used as a precedent with caution. Apparently no serious
attempt was made to show in evidence that the covenant was im-
posed as part of a plan, and the decision does not suggest any test
for determining when neighborhood change has been sufficient to
destroy the covenant. In the particular case, only one of the five
lots involved was still being used for residential purposes, but
the question of the grantor-covenantee's right to enforce actually
seems to have turned on waiver and abandoment resulting from
the conveyance of his own residence for commercial use after
suit was begun.
Landlord and Tenant:
The tort liability of a lessor for injuries resulting from a
defect in the premises may depend on whether he has retained
control of that part of the property where the injury occurs. If
the written lease clearly includes the defective part of the premises,
the responsibility falls on the lessee; but there is a presumption
that the owner of real estate retains the right of control until he
specifically parts with that right.15 In Starks Building Co. v.
Eltinge, 6 although a defective stairway leading to lessee's base-
ment restaurant was not expressly included in the lease, lessor
contended it was included as a matter of law, since it was a neces-
sary adjunct to the restaurant and was not for the common use
of several tenants. The trial court let the question go to the jury,
and the Court of Appeals sustained this decision on the theory
"The court cited only the following statement from 14 Am. Jur. Covenants,
Sec. 302: "A change in the character of the neighborhood which was intended to
be created by restrictions has generally been held to prevent their enforcement
in equity, where it is no longer possible to accomplish the purpose intended by
such covenant."
McGinley v. Alliance Trust Co., 168 Mo. 257, 258, 66 S.W. 153, 154,
56 L.R.A., 334 (1901).269 S.W. 2d 240 (Ky. 1954).
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that any implication arising from the fact that the stairway was a
necessary adjunct to the leased premises extended only to the
lessor's right to use it and not to the lessee's right to control it.
One particular fact in this case should be of interest to those
who draft commercial leases. Lessor introduced in evidence a
blueprint attached to the lease which showed the stairway leading
down to the basement where the restaurant was located. He con-
tended the blueprint was attached to the written lease for the
purpose of identifying the leased area, including the stairway.
Lessee contended, and apparently convinced the jury, that the
blueprint was attached only for the purpose of showing that part
of the basement included in the lease. If the lessor intended to
include the stairway, this intention should have been clearly
stated with a more specific reference to the appropriate part of
the blueprint. Indefinite references to accompaning maps and
documents can be a real source of trouble in drafting complicated
leases.
One rather unusual lease case involving a problem of sur-
render and the resulting rights of a sub-lessee came before the
court in 1954. In Miller v. Tutt,1T lessor leased a hotel for ten
years, stipulating in the lease that the property should not be
sublet without his written permission. Within two years, lessee
sublet the premises for five years, and at the end of this time
renewed the sublease for three more years to fill out the full term
of the original lease. Lessor knew of sublessee's occupancy under
the sublease for several years, but there was no evidence he knew
the terms of the sublease or had any knowledge of the purported
extension of it. Lessor attempted to regain possession of the hotel
over a considerable length of time, and eventually repurchased
the original lease from lessee. Subsequently, lessor accepted a
single rent payment from the sublessee on condition that the
premises be vacated, but thereafter he refused to accept rent.
The sublessee claimed the lessor was bound by the sublease,
including the extension; and also that after surrender of the
original lease lessor stood in no better position than the original
lessee. Sublessee insisted further that the lessor had waived all
right to object to the occupancy in any event. Although the trial
--264 S.W. 2d 649 (Ky. 1954).
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court decided lessor had waived the prohibition against subletting,
it held he was not bound by the purported extension of the sub-
lease since this was merely a subterfuge to continue sublessee in
possession after the original leasehold rights of the first tenant
were extinguished by surrender. In affirming the judgment, the
Court of Appeals distinguished a 1952 case holding that a lessor
waives forfeiture resulting from subleasing by accepting rent from
the sublessee with knowledge of the sublease.:' The court pointed
out that the lessor accepted rent only conditionally and had no
knowledge of the terms of the sublease as extended.
The sublessee seems to have claimed too much in this case.
He contended in effect that waiver of the prohibition against sub-
letting created a term for years relationship between himself and
the lessor. This analysis was rejected on the ground that waiver
could not extend so far as to create privity of estate or contract
between the lessor and sublessee where the former had no knowl-
edge of sublessee's occupancy prior to surrender of the original
lease. The terms of the sublease (particularly the extension of it)
were unknown to him, and the court took the view that there
could be no term for years where one party had not recognized
or agreed to the terms of the lease. If sublessee had claimed only
a tenancy by sufferance or at will resulting from lessor's knowledge
of his occupancy after surrender and cancellation of the original
lease, he would have been entitled to statutory notice pending
ouster, but his "estate" clearly would have been revocable.
The sublessee also contended that lessor could stand in no
better position than the original lessee. Perhaps this would be true
if the lessor were in the position of an assignee of the original
lease but as the court was careful to point out, he was claiming as
the rightful owner of the property, the original lease having been
surrendered. Although surrender will not defeat the estate of a
sublessee which he has rightfully acquired under the terms of the
original lease, the situation is different where his rights are ac-
quired in violation of such lease and without lessor's consent to
terms of the sublease. The decision reached in the Miller case
works no special hardship on sublessees since they can inquire of
their lessor concerning his authority to sublet, and they are pro-
"Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Norfleet, 252 S.W. 2d 54 (Ky.
1952).
KmTucEY LAW JoURNAL
tected in any event if the original lessor, having waived restric-
tions against subleasing, has knowledge of the terms of the sub-
lease.
Future Interests
Construction:
St. Joseph Hospital v. Dwertman9 was the court's most im-
portant future interests decision in 1954. It involved two con-
struction problems which have given the court considerable dif-
ficulty in recent years. First, whether the phrase "die without
issue" or its equivalent should be given a substitutional construc-
tion, and second, whether a life tenant's implied power to con-
sume and dispose except by will should be construed as unlimited.
The particular wording of the will was as follows:
I want my wife and daughter, during their lifetime, to
enjoy the full benefit of my estate. In case of the death of
both my wife and daughter and there are no heirs blessed
to her union then the estate is to be divided between three
charitable institutions. 20
The chancellor held these words created a joint life estate with
survivorship coupled with the full power to consume and dispose
of the entire estate other than by will. He also held that upon the
death of both life tenants the estate should be divided equally
among the charities unless the daughter had surviving children.
On appeal the wife and daughter contended the will gave
them fee simple ownership. The charities denied this and also
contended that the decision authorizing encroachment on corpus
was erroneous. The court sustained the chancellor as to the
nature of the estate created in the widow and daughter, and
refused to give the death without issue provision a substitutional
construction. It held, however, that the power to consume and
dispose was limited since the life tenant could not willfully waste
the property, nor give it away, nor dispose of it by will. The
court said that a life estate coupled with this sort of power was
appropriately characterized as a "consuming life estate."
'21
The life tenants' argument that the will gave them a fee rested
partly on the general import of the whole will and partly on the
- 268 S.W. 2d 646 (Ky. 1954).
', Id., at 646.21Id., at 648.
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belief that testator intended for their interest to be divested only
if they both died before he died. In other words, he provided for
the gift over to the charities conditioned on death of the widow
and death of the daughter without issue merely as a safeguard
against their death before the will became effective. Since they
did survive until the time when they could be devisees and legatees,
there was need for the gift over, and their subsequent death,
with or without issue has no legal significance. This sort
of interpretation is known as substitutional construction in the
authorities.22 It reflects a judicial preference for indefeasibly
vested present interests in fee, and is used most often when tes-
tator's precise intention cannot be derived from reading the will
as a whole.
As a Kentucky Law Journal student note, summarized more
fully infra,2 3 points out, the traditional Kentucky rule on sub-
stitutional construction makes a distinction between a devise of
real property and a bequest of personal property conditioned on
death without issue. The former raises no constructional prefer-
ence for substitutional interpretation, but the latter is given a
substitutional construction in the absence of any indication of
actual intention. Prior to the Dwertman case, the court had con-
firmed this distinction as recently as 1953, in a case where the will
disposed of both realty and personalty on condition of death
without issue.2 4 The difference in rule seems not to have been
considered in the Dwertman case at all. Based in part on statute
2 5
and in part on a line of cases stemming from Harvey v. Bell,20 the
rule was stated in the instant case as follows:
... unless a different purpose is plainly expressed in the
instrument, every limitation in a will contingent upon a
person dying 'without heirs' or 'without children' or 'issue'
or other words of like import shall be construed a limitation
to take effect when such person dies.
27
For a full analysis and treatment of the doctrine see 2 Simes, Future In-
terests, Secs. 326-833 (1936).
See discussion beginning on p. 55.
" Howard v. Reynolds, 261 S.W. 2d 815 (Ky. 1953).
KRS 381.080 "Unless a different purpose is plainly expressed in the instru-
ment, every limitation in a deed or will contingent upon a person dying 'without
heirs,' or 'without children' or 'issue,' or other words of like import, shall be con-
strued a limitation to take effect when such person dies, unless the object on
which the contingency is made to depend in then living, or if a child of his body,
such is born within ten months next thereafter."
118 Ky. 512, 81 S.W. (1904).
268 S.W. 2d 646, at p. 647 (Ky. 1954).
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In applying this rule to the Dwertman will, the court justified
its rejection of substitutional construction on the grounds that
the whole will showed a different intent. Thus the meaningless
distinction between a devise and a bequest conditioned on death
without issue was confirmed indirectly. Although the logic under-
lying substitutional construction may be appealing in construing
a given will, there is no conceivable justification for applying it to
a devise and not applying it to a bequest. At its first opportunity
the court should repudiate this distinction and should clarify the
Kentucky constructional preference where testator fails to reveal
his intention in other parts of the will.
As for the scope of the power to consume and dispose con-
ferred by implication on the life tenants, the Dwertman case ex-
pressly follows Collings v. Collings Ex'rs,28 decided in 1953. In
the Collings opinion it was made quite clear that a Kentucky
testator cannot confer unlimited power to dispose inter vivos on
the first taker as life tenant merely by a general provision in the
will authorizing him to use and dispose except by will. Unless
the power is express and explicit it will be construed so as to
prevent the life tenant from willfully wasting the property or
giving it away. The more fundamental problem presented in the
Collings case, whether the first taker's interest can be given effect
as a possessory fee simple subject to an executory interest over
conditioned on failure of the first taker to dispose was not treated
in the Dwertman case. As the writer will suggest in a forthcoming
article discussing remnant gifts over in Kentucky, the court must
eventually review its basic position on this problem-a position
which has evolved slowly since Hanks v. McDannel 29-before any
completely satisfactory scheme for construing wills similar to the
Dwertman instrument can be worked out.
Trusts
Income-Principal:
In 1954 the Kentucky court finally abandoned the so-called
Kentucky rule for apportionment of a stock dividend between the
successive beneficiaries of a trust or the successive owners of legal
1260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953). For a full comment on the case see 42
Ky. L.J. 717 (1954). This comment is summarized infra p. 56.
307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W. 2d 784 (1948).
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estates. The decision in Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r,3 0 points out that
at least three rules have been used by American jurisdictions to
solve this particular problem in fiduciary administration. The
traditional Kentucky rule awarded all extraordinary corporate
dividends in their entirety to the life tenant without regard for
whether it was a stock dividend or a cash dividend or whether it
represented earnings that accumulated wholly before or wholly
after, or partly before or partly after, the commencement of the
life estate. The Massachusetts rule gives the entire extraordinary
dividend from earnings to corpus if essentially a stock dividend
and to income if essentially a cash dividend, without inquiry in
either case as to the time covered by the accumulation of earnings
which the dividend represents, and without undertaking to ap-
portion the benefit in the event the earnings accrued partly before
and partly after the stock became subject to the life interest. The
Pennsylvania rule adopts a middle ground and apportions the
dividend on the basis of the time covered by the accumulation
of earnings embraced by the extraordinary distribution. If earned
before the commencement of the life estate, it goes to corpus; if
earned after that time, then to the life estate as income; if earned
partly before and partly after the beginning of the life estate, it
is apportioned on proper basis between corpus and income.
In repudiating the Kentucky rule and adopting the Massa-
chusetts rule, the court followed the majority trend in other
jurisdictions which have come to this conclusion either by judicial
decision or by enactment of the Uniform Income and Principal
Act. The Bowles case also is in keeping with the court's previous
criticism of the Kentucky rule in Laurent v. Randolph,31 and with
the view of stock dividends taken by the Supreme Court.3 2 In-
terestingly enough, as is pointed out in a recent Kentucky Law
Journal comment on the Bowles opinion 3 3 the court made no
mention of of the Kentucky statutory rule for allocation of stock
dividends adopted in 1950.34 On its face the Kentucky statute pro-
vides a rigid formula to govern this sort of dividend. If the
dividend is paid in shares of the same class and is paid at a rate
m267 S.W. 2d 707 (Ky. 1954).
p306 Ky. 134, 188, 206 S.W. 2d 480, 482 (1947).
Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 (1890).
M43 Ky. L.J. 447 (1955).
KRS 386.020(4).
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of ten percent or more of the outstanding shares of that class
before the dividend is declared, it is principal. If paid at a rate of
less than ten percent, it is income. There is nothing in the
statute to suggest that the dividend must be classified as essentially
a stock dividend or as essentially a cash dividend before the
statutory formula is applied to its distribution.
Although the trust in the Bowles case was created long before
the statute was passed and although the allocation of the particu-
lar dividend satisfied the statutory formula since the dividend rate
was more than ten percent, the failure of the court to mention the
statutory rule leaves the new Kentucky rule unclear. If the Bowles
case is followed literally, an extraordinary dividend which is es-
sentially a stock dividend should be given to principal even
though it is paid at a rate less than ten percent of the shares of
the same class. This is completely contrary to the explicit wording
of the statute, and there seems to be no satisfactory way of recon-
ciling the conflict. The statute may have been enacted in an at-
tempt to move toward the Massachusetts rule, but now that the
court has embraced the Massachusetts rule completely, the statu-
tory formula is either ineffective or the rule established by the
Bowles case extends only to stock dividends declared at a rate of
ten percent or more. As the court pointed out, the pure Mas-
sachusetts rule is a more sensible one because:
The basic argument in favor of the Massachusetts rule is
the fact that a stock dividend is not in any true sense a
dividend at all, since it involves no division or severance
from the corporate assets of the subject of the dividend.a5
If a stock dividend does not distribute property but simply
dilutes the shares as they existed before, there is little logical
reason for distributing it as income merely because it is declared
at a rate of less than ten percent. If the Massachusetts rule has a
weakness it is the fact that the trustee or the executor must first
determine whether the extraordinary dividend is essentially a
stock dividend or essentially a cash dividend. The legal basis for
this classification is obscure at best.
-267 S.W. 2d 707, 708 (Ky. 1954).
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II. LAW JOURNAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The law relating to resulting and constructive trusts has always
been a fertile field for litigation in Kentucky. More than twenty
years ago the late Dean Alvin E. Evans wrote an article com-
prehensively treating local problems in this area which the Court
of Appeals has used and cited from time to time.36 During 1954
a leading article and a student note were published which evaluate
a number of the important constructive trust and resulting cases
decided since 1981. The article, styled Current Developments in
Resulting Trusts and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky,37 written
by Wesley Gilmer, Jr. of the Danville Bar, is a summary of the
leading modern Kentucky decisions defining and applying well
known constructive and resulting trust principles. It describes the
essentials, purpose and nature of each, and also explains the ap-
plication of the Kentucky statute prohibiting purchase-money
resulting trusts.38 The student note written by Paul Decker,
39
now of the Missouri Bar, is a more specialized effort to properly
rationalize the purchase-money trust in this state.
The Decker note was occasioned by the court's express refusal
in a 1953 case 40 to reconcile what it called "the apparent conflict"
in the Kentucky cases concerning the proper designation of a trust
arising under Kentucky Revised Statutes 381.170. In the par-
ticular case the court reaffirmed its rule that no trust arises under
the statute when a deed is made to one person and the considera-
tion is paid by another person, unless the grantee takes the deed
in his own name without the consent of the person paying the
consideration or unless the grantee, in violation of a trust or an
agreement, purchases the land with the effects of another person.
The analysis in this note makes it quite clear that the interpreta-
tion of the statute has been confused by a failure to distinguish
carefully between the basic nature of a resulting trust and a con-
structive trust. A detailed discussion of the effect of the statute in
three situations is given: (1) where grantee takes property in his
own name without consent, (2) where grantee takes property in
Evans, Resulting and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky, 20 Ky. L.J. 383
(1931).242 Ky. L.J. 456 (1954).
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 381.170.
' "Purchase-Money" Trusts in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 478 (1954).
' Sewell v. Sewell, 260 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953).
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his own name in violation of a trust or where the effect would be
to defraud creditors, and (3) where grantee takes property in his
own name with an oral agreement to hold the property in trust.
Mr. Decker concludes that the Kentucky statute abolishing pur-
chase-money resulting trusts only applies where title is taken with
consent and no agreement is present. If title is taken without
consent, a constructive trust arises, and this is the case also if title
is taken in violation of a trust. Where title is taken with consent
but there is a parol agreement to reconvey, the trust may be
enforced in Kentucky on the basis of an express trust since the
statute of frauds as to trusts does not exist here and the section
concerning the sale of real estate is not applied in those cases
where the person seeking to enforce the trust paid the considera-
tion for the property.
Continuing interest throughout the state in the legal problems
incident to the use of water for agricultural irrigation makes any
research in this phase of property law important. In 1952 a very
valuable note was published summarizing the legal rights of Ken-
tucky land owners who irrigate from riparian surface streams.41
In the 1954 volume George B. Baker, now of the Henderson Bar,
contributes a treatment of Irrigation With Non-Riparian Surface
Water and Subterranean Water in Kentucky.42 The Baker note
defines riparian and non-riparian water on the basis of whether
it is found in a stream or not and points out that the usual cri-
terion of a stream is water flowing in a natural bed or channel,
with defined banks and permanent sources of supply, although in
times of drought the flow may be diminished or suspended. The
writer also confirms that use of underground stream water in
Kentucky is governed by the same legal principles as govern sur-
face riparian water. As for subterranean percolating water, he
distinguishs between the common law rule permitting absolute
ownership and use by the owner of the land and the so-called
American rule basing the land owner's rights on a reasonable use
theory. He concludes that the former rule clearly applies in Ken-
tucky subject to two limitations: (1) the use must not be a
malicious or unnecessary one and (2) an owner must not con-
taminate or poison the water so that it is unfit for his neighbor's
use.
- 40 Ky. L.J. 423 (1952). -42 Ky. L.J. 493 (1954).
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No Kentucky cases were found involving directly the use of
percolating waters for irrigation, but the writer correctly predicts
that the common law rule respecting a general use of such water
would be followed if the question were presented to the courts.
The same dearth of direct authority exists as to irrigation with
non-riparian surface waters, those waters diffused over the land
or merely draining through natural depressions, such as gulleys
and low places. This note emphasizes that litigation concerning
surface water rights in Kentucky and elsewhere traditionally has
dealt with the right of the land owner to discharge it rather than
to put it to beneficial use, but concludes that the owner of land
where surface water is found or confined owns the water abso-
lutely.
The May, 1954, issue of the Kentucky Law Journal43 was a 200
page Symposium on the law of wills and administration of estates
dedicated to the memory of former Dean Alvin E. Evans, a rank-
ing authority and writer in this field. Every contribution to this
exceptionally fine symposium should be of major interest to Ken-
tucky property lawyers as well as those working in the field
throughout the country. Most of the articles and notes, however,
treat problems in the limited area of wills and administration, or
are not focused directly on Kentucky law. Space limitations here
permit summary of only two student comments appearing in this
issue which do evaluate recent Kentucky cases dealing with future
interests problems.
The first discusses the substitutional construction problem in
Howard v. Reynolds,44 mentioned earlier,45 and the second is a
comment on Collings v. Collings Ex'rs,4 6 pertaining to a remainder
over following a purported fee.47 In commenting on the Howard
case, Wendell S. Williams, now of the Kentucky Bar and clerk to
the Court of Appeals, traces fully the history of the Kentucky rule
on substitutional construction. He points out that except for cer-
tain implications in the Howard Case, the rule for personalty is
contrary to the rule for realty. Although the Howard opinion may
42 Ky. L.J. 523-723 (1954).
261 S.W. 2d 815 (1953)- Substitutional Construction as Pertaining to Die
Without Issue, 42 Ky. L.J. 714 (1954).
' See discussion, supra, p. 49.
" 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1954), op. cit. supra, p. 50; Wills: Remainder Over
Following Purported Fee, 42 Ky. L.J. 717 (1954).
" See discussion, supra, p. 50.
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be interpreted as rejecting substitutional construction in the
case of a bequest, this note concludes that the rule of Harvey v.
Bell48 remains intact since the Howard will as a whole expressed
a contrary intent. The note discovers no rational basis for con-
tinuing the distinction and suggests that the court adopt the same
rule for a devise and a bequest. Interestingly enough Williams
discovered that the court once inferred that the rule should be
the same for both classes of property.49
In commenting on the Collings case, Roger S. Leland, now in
military service, reviews the Kentucky cases dealing with remnant
gifts over since 1948. He points out that the court has not mini-
mized the problem of interpreting home made wills very sub-
stantially by classifying the validity of a remainder after a pur-
ported fee as entirely a construction question. He shows that cer-
tain enumerated incidents of ownership, such as the power to
dispose by will, are the decisive factors in determining testator's
intention as to the nature of the first taker's estate, which in turn
governs the validity of the gift over. Although this note con-
cedes there might have been some reason to believe before the
Collings decision that there could be a valid gift over after a fee
in Kentucky, it concludes that this hope is eliminated by the case.
This is probably a sound interpretation of the case in so far as the
scope of the court's analysis of this vexing problem is concerned;
but there remains the possibility of enforcing the gift over after
a fee as an executory interest conditioned on failure of the first
taker to consume or dispose, a rationalization which the court has
not considered or decided in modern times.
Finally, the now well-known decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Barrows v. Jackson,50 concerning the enforc-
ability of racial restrictive covenants by suit for damages was
given extensive treatment in a student comment, also written by
Mr. Leland, under the title Equal Protection-Enforcement of
Restrictive Covenants." In this note the writer makes a careful
comparison of Mr. Justice Minton's opinion in the Barrows case
" 118 Ky. 512, 523, 81 S.W. 2d 671, 674 (1904), op. cit. supra, p. 49.
"See: Haggins Trustee et al. v. Haggin, 283 Ky. 821, 143 S.W. 2d 522
(1940).
50346 U.S. 249 (1953).
'43 Ky. L.J. 151 (1954).
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with Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer.52 He
also analizes the interim cases of Weiss v. Leaon,53 Roberts v.
Curtis,54 Correll v. Earley,55 and Phillips v. Naff.56 The Supreme
Court's basis for classifying both the suit for injunction and the
suit for damages within its concept of "state action" is described.
The note concludes with an attempt to project the effect of the
Barrows case on certain other evasive devices for compelling
compliance with the covenant, such as imposition of a condition
on title, use of a cash penalty bond, reservation of an option to
repurchase, and obtaining from every subsequent grantee a per-
sonal money deposit to be forfeited upon breach. The view is
finally taken that the Supreme Court must eventually decide un-
equivocally that all racial covenants, restrictions, terms, and limita-
tions, in whatever form and in whatever manner provided, are
void. Otherwise, existing social and economic pressures will force
recurring presentation of the constitutional problem to the highest
court.
III. NEW STATUTE
The most important piece of legislation in the property field
during 1954 was the water resources and water rights law. The
new provisions appear as Kentucky Revised Statutes, 262.670 to
262.690, and they have been fully discussed in a recent student
note57 written by J. Arna Gregory, now of the Kentucky Bar and
clerk to the Court of Appeals. Since this note carefully portrays
the effect of the statute section by section and also summarizes the
Kentucky law of riparian rights prior to its enactment, it may be
helpful here merely to describe the comparatively limited scope
of the legislation. The provision of the act directing the Ken-
tucky Legislative Research Commission to study the need for ad-
ditional legislation points up the fact that this statute is not a
comprehensive water law code in any sense.
The statute declares the authority of the state to regulate and
control water occuring in any natural stream, natural lake or
- .334 U.S. 1 (1948).
' 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. 2d 127 (1949).
' 93 Fed. Supp. 604 (D.C., D.C. 1950).
205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1951).
332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W. 2d 158 (1952).
'7 Riparian Rights-Analysis of New Statutory Provisions, 43 Ky. L.J. 407
(1955).
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other natural water body because the conservation and beneficial
use of this resource is essential to the general welfare, but it
establishes no regulatory machinery and empowers no existing
state agency to perform this public function. In preparing this
legislation for consideration of the General Assembly, it was
thought that no immediate need existed for an elaborate licensing
and control system. The statute was proposed and adopted on
the theory that a few weaknesses in the existing case law governing
use of stream water for agricultural purposes should be corrected,
and that any attempt to provide Kentucky with a fully developed
code for use and conservation of all water resources should await
further study and development.
As Gregory's discussion shows in detail,58 the principle sub-
stantive effect of the statute is to eliminate the confusion in the
cases concerning the use of a "natural flow" theory or a "reason-
able use" theory to measure the extent of permissible use by the
upper riparian owner. The legislature has committed Kentucky
to the reasonable use theory, but has left to the courts the form-
idable task of defining this test through application of the statute.
The act also confirms the traditional priority extended to domestic
uses and provides a slightly clearer definition of these uses than
can be worked out in the cases.
Although purporting to be a statute designed to encourage the
conservation of public water-water found in a natural stream
et cetera-, this legislation achieves very little modification of the
common law doctrine of riparian rights, a doctrine which imposes
little penalty on the wasteful user unless he interferes with a right-
ful use down stream. Water standing in a stream at a time when
the stream ceases to flow is classified under the statute as non-
riparian water in order that the abutting land owner may put it
to a beneficial use absolutely, and the land owner is permitted to
impound water in a stream when the stream flow is in excess of
existing reasonable use. These features will correct some apparent
inequities under strict application of the riparian rights doctrine,
but whether they will result in the conservation of much water
remains to be seen. One provision of the statute, probably enacted
to encourage conservation through the preservation of existing
1 Id. at p. 412.
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beneficial uses, needs to be clarified through judicial interpreta-
tion or legislative amendment. KRS 262.690, Sec. 3, subsec. 2
provides that a riparian owner shall have the right to the reason-
able use of water which will not deny others sufficient water for
domestic purposes, "or impair existing uses of the owners hereto-
fore established." Since the word unreasonable does not appear
in the quoted phrase, a literal reading of the clause out of context
might suggest that the reasonable use theory or test is not applied
to uses of public water already established. This would amount to
a sort of limited application of the so-called prior appropriation
theory, and would work to the advantage of a particular land
owner on the stream if he were the first to establish a special use,
such as irrigation. There is nothing in the background of the
legislation to indicate the legislature intended this result, and the
pertinent section is susceptable of an interpretation consistent
with the whole statute when read in context, but the point needs
clarification.
Above all, those interested in the Kentucky "water problem"
as well as agricultural, industrial and municipal users of Kentucky
water should recognize that the 1954 statute is only a good begin-
ning. Continuing effort should be made to design legislation
which will help solve many problems. The uncertain legal position
of competing stream users, the local governmental pressures cre-
ated by increasing demand for agricultural, industrial and mu-
nicipal water supply, and the satisfactory control of all water in
the interest of conservation are only a few of the problems that
are certain to become more critical.
